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Book Revzews 
Tbe Poetics ot Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage by Marjorie Perloff. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. xvi + 346. $20.00. 
It is hard not to admire the courage of Marjorie Perloff's work. She sets out to 
do nothing less than recast the modernist canon, writing with evident pleasure 
of poets disdained for their incoherence and exclusively cerebral appeal. Drawn 
forth from obscurity and isolation, these sports of art become themselves a 
fecund species, a line fully as productive as the Romanticist-Symbolist dynasty 
to which they are contrasted. Moreover, once identified, this" Other Tradition" 
begins to encroach on its High Modernist opposite, claiming Pound, Williams, 
and Beckett as its own, the heirs or coevals of the likes of Rimbaud, Stein, 
Apollinaire, Ashbery, Cage, and Antin. Anyone compelled by such writers will 
feel grateful for Perloff's book, which promises to release us from the need to 
apologize to the guardians of the Great Tradition for OUI preoccupation with 
l\.1inimal Minors. 
And yet, though one might applaud Perloff's intent and eagerly await the 
change in literary values her book calls for, The Poetics of Indeterminacy is 
not the vehicle to effect this change. Its argument is problematic in almost 
every respect, threatening a critical indeterminacy that its author does not 
anticipate. Still, even this indeterminacy is interesting, and in fact instructive 
about the nature of criticism itself. And so, with sincere respect for Marjorie 
Perloff's learning, sophistication, and independence of mind, I would like to take 
issue with her book. 
VYhat is an indeterminate text? The answer that Perloff provides varies as 
the book proceeds. No reference to Heisenberg appears, and Derrida is con-
signed to a single footnote (of which, more later). Instead, we have Todorov's 
notion of «undecidability" defined initially on a pragmatic basis: because of the 
violation of the nonna! (!) relation between signifiant and signifie found in 
Symbolism, there are no controls on the associations that arise with texts of 
the Other Tradition. Thus," it becomes impossible to decide which of these 
associations are relevant and which are not. TIns is the 'undecidability' of 
the text" (pp. 17-18). To illustrate, Perloff juxtaposes texts of one 
tradition to those of another, finding the High Modernist ones determinate and 
the undecidable ones indeterminate. 
The manifest danger of such a technique, the critic's admission that she is 
at an interpretive loss, is not just that it is embarrassing, not just that the 
perverse reader will inevitably find such texts perfectly clear, but that the 
very status of criticism would require redefinition if texts were allowed to 
remain opaque, to have this" ambiguity of literalism." The more nonnal critical 
response is not to speak of that whereof one can make no sense. For example, 
discussing an Ashbery poem similar to one treated by Perloff, Richard Howard 
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quips: "I should say that was beyond critical dispute, or should be, simply 
because it is largely inaccessible to critical procedure. Fortunately (for my 
enterprise) not all of Ashbery's work ... resists analysis or even interest so 
successfully." 1 But Perloff not only wants to allow for opaque poems; she 
wants to talk about their opacity. And the effect of such talk is to make either 
the text become intelligible or the critic appear obtuse. 
In the first case, time after time Perloff's analyses of indeterminate works 
culminate in summaries that seem perfectly determinate: 
[Stein's "Edith Sitwell"J explores the nature of concord and discord, 
sameness and difference between two friends. [p. 80] 
[And though] poem after poem in [Williams'sJ Spring and All is 
characterized by ... Cubist mobility and indeterminancy [po 129], Spring 
and All enacts the difficult process whereby this "hell" is "lit" by 
flashes of the" dark woman," the Kora who is waiting to be discovered. 
... Out of the "messy" and unwieldy prose, out of the disorder of 
language, the bland crowds and "patches of standing water," "dazed 
spring approaches." [po 137J 
The critical act is unfortunately one of patching and mending, of reconciling 
words to systems of value, and thus whenever Perloff lets her guard slip she 
collapses the opposition between determinate and indeterminate art that she is 
out to establish. 
When she keeps her guard up, on the other hand, she is just as likely to 
strike the reader as obtuse, willfully blind to a pattern of meaning presented. For 
me, the most glaring example of this blindness is the tr~atment of Stein's 
"Melanctha," one of the most relentlessly plotted and coherently characterized 
stories in all of literature. Faced with Stein's picture of the self-defeating, 
contradictory heroine and her contagious effect on her lover, Perloff is stymied: 
"Melanctha is submissive but wild, graceful but self-destructive, soothing but 
always getting into trouble, intelligent but never able to get what she wants. A 
similar indeterminacy is found in the characterization of [her lover] Jeff 
Campbell" (p.93). 
The idea that realist character is normally without inconsistency is just one 
of many simplistic tests for indeterminacy applied to literary works. One even 
suspects at times that Perloff might be talking down to us, enlisting the aid of 
what she takes to be the naive realist in order to establish the identity of 
indeterminate art. For example, she assumes that a text that does not directly 
illustrate its title is indeterminate: "Rimbaud evokes • cities' [in "Villes"] 
that are, from the start, impossible to locate in • real' space. For although the 
poem unfolds a metonymic network of urban images ... these references to a 
possible city are consistently canceled out by images of wild nature" (p. 50). 
The logical response to such a state of affairs would be to decide that the 
poem was not about cities in "real" space, but about something else, and that 
the title was to be taken figuratively. But the first breach between text and title 
1 Richard Howard, Alone with Ame1'ica, enlarged ed. (New York: Atheneum, 
1980), p. 53. 
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is enough to establish its indeterminacy for Perloff, regardless of the potential 
significance in such a breach. The corrollary of this attitude is Perloff's irritating 
habit of comparing poems on the basis of their titles. Thus, we find (' city 
poems" or "lake poems" or "box poems" ranged against each other like the 
control group and the subject of an experiment, as if to say, "When Eliot writes 
a poem about a city, he writes a poem about a city-but Rimbaud-now there's 
an indeterminate writer." 
The naIvete of PerlofPs stance is sometimes extremely jarring. She calls 
our attention to a line from Beckett's I-Iow It Is: "only onc thing to do go back 
or at least only another thrash round where I lie." Then she comments: 
"Supplying the missing [syntactic} links is ... not the reader's main problem; 
the real puzzle is semantic. Why is the 'only thing to do' to 'go back'? 
Why is the inertia of 'thrashEing] round where I lie' 'at least' the 'only 
other' thing to do? There is no way of deciding" (p. 232). There is none, 
indeed, if one fails to consider existentialist philosophy, absurdist literature, and 
most of the mainstream of twentieth-century culture. 
This contextual innocence on PerIoff's partJ is all the more surprising in light 
of the sophisticated critical concepts that she marshals on behalf of her 
point of view. The problem here unfortunately is that she often invokes them 
incorrectly. One repeated error is the confusion of the reference to specific 
existent objects with reference in general~in semiotic tenns, denotation versus 
designation. For example, "Unlike, say, Gertrude Stein or, for that matter, 
Rimbaud, [Pound] does not call into question the relationship of signifier to 
signified. We can readily identify the fresco 'at Capoquadri ... over the door-
way,' Francis Thompson's then modern poem, 'The Hound of Heaven,' or T. E. 
Lawrence's photographs of ' rock temples in Arabia Petra.' ... But these illusionis-
tic, literal images are consistently' interfering' with one another, so as to remind 
us that the world of the poem is not, after all, the real world" (p. 196). The 
relation of signifier to signified does not remain intact just because we can 
identify the works of art mentioned; that is, denotation does not imply straight-
forward designation. Moreover, when has one ever assumed that the world of a 
poem was the "real world"? Even when an artist musters up every gesture 
and convention of realism, the relation of work to world is always problematic. 
This careless use of semiotic terms renders PerIoff's position tenuous at best. 
So much for the pragmatic definition of textual indeterminacy: the presence 
in a work of conflicting, undecidable interpretations. The possibility that 
tlns is more a condition of the reader than the text does not occur to Perloff, 
but I find it hard to avoid. We are constantly gaining insight into texts that pre-
viously seemed indetenninate or incomprehensible, by growing as readers. More-
over, a text's intelligibility and determinacy are also a function of critical and 
aesthetic history. In the early years of this century, Mallarme and Eliot were 
hardly the determinate retrogrades that Perloff paints, nor will her Other Tra-
dition be able to maintain its otherness under the onslaught of critical inter-
pretation-an onslaught, I should add, of which The Poetics of indeterminacy 
is a part. Yet Perloff clearly holds that indeterminacy is a property of teJl."ts. 
not readers, and of post-Rimbaldian and only post-Rimbaldian texts at that. 
"I am aware that here I take issue with Derridean theory. 'Indeterminacy,' as 
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I use that term in this book, is taken to· be the quality of particular art works 
in a particular period of history rather than as the central characteristic of 
all texts at all times 1) (po 17, note). The idea that indeterminacy is a property 
at all seems contradictory, given the pragmatic nature of the term's initial 
usc. Moreover, it is a pity that this interesting dispute with Derrida should 
run its course in a feamote. 
Is it really possible to declare without a blush that The WaSie Land is deter-
minate whereas the "poetry of Rimbaud and his heirs" defies determinate 
interpretation? The idea that allows Perloff to do so is the sloppy notion of 
aesthetic semiosis that was touched on earlier: in the mainstream poem from 
Romanticism to Symbolism to High Modernism, howev.er difficult the meaning 
may be to decode, "the relationship of the word to its referents, of signifier 
to signified, remains essentially intact," whereas tlus relationslup is undermined 
in the Other Tradition (pp. 17-18). In the Symbolist line, the way to meaning 
is difficult but possible; in indeterminate art there is no meaning but the surface 
(pp. 27-28). In the first, words have "specific connotations H; in the second 
they have, rather, a "compositional value" (p. 23). In the first, metaphor is 
the predominant semantic mode: "Mr. Eugcnides is related, along the axis 
of metaphor or substitution, to all the other sinister charlatans in the poem, 
just as every other woman in The Waste Land is a version of 'Belladonna, the 
Lady of the Rocks/the Lady of Situations'" (p. 16). In indeterminate poetry, 
however, metonymy prevails: "in Kora, drinking tea may be either good or bad 
depending on what has just happened or is about to happen. When the poet 
finds himself at nightfall alone at the inn without the desired woman, he 
naturally concludes: 'what poor tea it was.' The axis of contiguity thus re-
places the axis of substitution" (p. 119). And, we nught add, Pop semiotics 
thus replaces a thorough examination of the subject. Perhaps this imprecise 
semiotics is the single most disheartening feature of the boole: that theoretical 
concepts as precise and powerful as these can be so imprecisely and inertly 
used, that conclusions as suggestive and accurate, I think, as those Perloff intuits 
could be justified by such fallacious reasoning. 
To be specific, what docs it mean to say that the signifier-signified relation 
remains intact? Sometimes Perloff means that terms denote rather than merely 
designate, as we saw earlier; sometimes that they appear in grammatical sentences; 
sometimes that they are metaphoric rather than metonymic; sometimes that they 
are not excessively repeated; sometimes that they are concrete or at least do 
not appear in indefinite, long sentences. Clearly the terms "signifier" and 
" signified" are themselves indeterminate here, and the dismissal of fundamental 
issues such as Derridean slippage begins to look either sinister or unforgivably 
careless. No matter how troublesome Derrida and the other theoreticians of 
semiotics, structuralism, and post-structuralism may be, no matter how quickly 
one wants to get to the poetry at hand, the category of indeterminacy and the 
placement of certain writers within it will remain utterly meaningless if the 
issues arc not bid out consistently and logically. 
Just to give an idea of how a little Jakobson can be a dangerous thing, we 
might pursue Perloff's use of t< metonymy." She claims that Stein rejected 
realism, producing in Tender Buttons purely metonymic te::\'tS. Aside from the 
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fact that she is wrong about Stein's understanding of realism, Jakobson specifi-
cally identifies metonymy as a technique of realism. 2 Moreover, Jakobson else-
where 3 reveals how SlipPC1Y the term" realism" is, establishing meanings for it 
that would include any work to be found in the Other Tradition. Indeed most 
of these indeterminate writers would probably justify theif unorthodoxy in 
the name of realism. 
The comparison of indeterminate poetry to Cubist art has the same amateurish 
quality. Referring continually to onc idea by Gombrich-that illusion is 
suspended in the presence of two conflicting interpretive possibilities-Perloff 
feels at liberty to pursue the analogy to the visual arts anywhere the inspiration 
of the moment leads. Thus, one ends up with completely fatuous comparisons: 
"Just as the 'Cubist' painter recognizes that, in Apollinairc's words, 'You 
may paint with whatever material you please. \vith pipes, postage stamps, 
postcards or playing cards ... " so the verbal artist like Gertrude Stein takes words 
and unlinks them' from their former relationships in the sentence'" (pp. 114-15). 
What that "so" means here is a real mystery to me. But more importantly, 
the idea lifted out of Gombrich's extensive and complicated writings is terribly 
misleading. Though it is true that in Cubism conflicting interpretations inter-
fere with illusionism, this conflict is not the only reason for the defeat of 
illusionism in Cubism. Moreover, it does not necessarily eliminate illusionism 
outside of Cubism. One thinks of Dali's or Archimbaldo's double images, 
which are miracles of illusionism. Visual indeterminacy is thus flattened into a 
single trait, and then it is shifted bodily over to literature. "Image," however, 
does not mean the same thing with reference to the two arts; the presence of 
two-even of two conflicting-interpretations does not necessarily interfere 
with the "illusionism" of a literary work (whatever that is). As with the 
semiotic terms, the art-historical component of PerIoff's argument is very weak.'" 
2 Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fund(f711e11tais of Language (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1971), p. 90-96. 
3 Roman Jakobson, "On Realism," in Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist 
and Structuralist Views, cd. Ladislav Matejka and Kristyna Pomorska (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.1. T. Press, 1971). 
4 I should mention, too, some problems of fact and concept. Perloff claims 
that Rimbaud is the great source of the indeterminate tradition. Yet Williams 
frequently denies any French influence in his literature and Stein was directly 
influenced by the determinate (in Perloff's view) Flaubert. Further, Perloff 
offers the following potential models for Stein's portraiture: Edgar Lee Masters's 
Spoon River Antbology (1915), "Yeats's mythologizing portraits of Maud 
Gonne in Tbe Green Helmet (1910), Pound's Browningesque 'Portrait d'une 
Femme' (1912), or Eliot's 'Prufrock' and 'Portrait of a Lady'" (both 1910-
1911). She then goes on to say that these were not models that Stein used. 
But not only were they not-they could not have been. Stein began her 
portraiture in 1908, and had been developing the theory behind it ever since 
her days as a psychology student before the turn of the century. Influence is 
such an ambiguous concept that it hardly seems worth pressing this point, but 
this chronological imprecision is troublesome. Similarly, on p. 111, PerIoff 
,: 
..... 
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But even acknowledging all this, one feels that in some sense Perlaff is 
right. There are some texts produced during the past hundred years that take 
particularly troublesome liberties with language. The critic faced with this 
fact might be led to ask why writers have taken to writing this way, in other 
words, what the cultural function and value of such art might be. It is just 
here, however, that Perloff is most irritatingly silent. She insists that some works 
are simply not open to the kind of interpretive action that critics are so prone 
to undertake, and then she stops. "The meaning of 'A Substance in a 
Cushion,' like that of the title Tender Buttons, remains latent, impossible to 
translate into something else [shades of "The Heresy of Paraphrase" ?-no, that 
indeterminacy belongs, according to its propounder. to all art]. And indeed the 
important thing is not to establish a fixed meaning for anyone item here ... , 
but to see how carefully Gertrude Stein has structured the whole sequence" 
(p. 107). We know she was careful, apparently, because it is not easy to 
create such verbal indeterminacy, and a more careless hand (that of Edith 
Sitwell is adduced as an example) would have slipped into mere ambiguity. But 
when Perloff takes the time to describe this structuring, she resorts to the most 
primitive-and often incorrect-formal analysis. (The treatment of accent on p. 
317 is inconsistent with any linguistic or poetic theory that I know; the discovery 
of consonance on p. 127 equates the jzl in "ladies" with the Is/ in "socks.") 
And we are finally left to wonder why Perloff values indeterminacy at all. 
I know why I value it, and you no doubt have your reasons, but Perloff's case 
is minimal: such art reacts against an outdated tradition (a question-begging 
justification), it is interesting (how? why?), it is hard to produce (isn't all art?). 
and so on. It is not that one would want her to give in and dig our The Meaning 
of the Poem and weigh it in The Scales of Contemporary Values. But one is 
left with a feeling of blank mystery and dogmatic prohibition: "don't try to 
act like a critic and come to a determinate reading of tlns text; that would 
be pure conservative wilfulness, an imposition on what is to be valued as a 
stream or a concrete shard or any other numinous but indeterminate object." 
No serious (or humorous) critic can be satisfied with such a demand for 
passive assent. 
Thus, The Poetics of Indeterminacy seems to be only a first stage in the 
critical reception of the difficult poets it treats. Still, as such, it is extremely 
writes that" Picasso's painting was considered to be the meeting-ground of these 
different schools, ranging as it does from the neo-Romanticism of the Blue 
Period to the severities of Analytic Cubism to Surrealist fantasy. What all these 
painters [mentioned in Apollinaire's Les Peintres cubistes] had in common-and 
this is Apollinaire's point about' l'esprit nouveau '-was a rejection of an art that is 
primarily representational." But Apollinaire's view was enunciated in 1911 when 
neither Picasso nor anyone else had ventured into "Surrealist fantasy." This 
imprecision continues in Perloft's failure to distinguish analytic from synthetic 
Cubism, her treating the two as consistent or identical. And her claim that 
Williams's symbolism in Paterson was a mode that he was uncomfortable with, 
his earlier indeterminacy being instead his native element, is belied by his 
vehemently symbolist history. In the American Grain, published as early as 1925. 
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useful in delineating the issues in that reception: the model of the visual arts, 
the concepts of modernism and postmodernism, the influence of romanticism, 
the importance of continental, especially French, influences, and the need for 
(an accurate) semiotics for understanding the complex semantics of such art. 
Perl off's wonderful sensitivity to French nuance, her command of modern 
poetry and its criticism, and her style and authority cannot but evoke our 
admiration. At the same time, they should not blind us to the attitude toward 
intellectualism implicit in the faults of this book In an earlier study of Frank 
O'Hara Perloff commented: "Throughout this book I have tried to keep in 
mind O'Hara's own strictures on literary criticism, so charmingly put forward in 
the little poem, 'The Critic.' ... I hope that if O'Hara were alive today, he 
would not consider me 'the assassin of [his] orchards.' I have tried, on the 
contrary, to respect his wish: 'Do not/frighten me more than you/have to! 
I must live forever.''' 5 It may very well be, however, that the orchard cannot 
bloom unless it is first assassinated, nor immortality come to a poet whom 
criticism has not affrighted. This fearsomeness is not merely a critic's power to 
say yes or no, but the unleashing on a text of the full force of his or her 
lmowledgc and self-awareness. Anything less cheats the text, protects it where 
it should need no protection, and thus inevitably enfeebles it. To understand 
the difficult texts that Perloff considers we need a poetics of indeterminacy and 
not a religion of it. 
University of Pennsylvania 
WENDY STEINER 
The Monstrous Races in A1edie·val Art and Thougbt by John Block Friedman. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 268. 
$20.00. 
Chewbacca the Wookie and his ilk~the Jawas, the Ugnauts and Yoda-have, des-
pite their blandness, become familiar inhabitants of the contemporary imagination, 
but as with so much of our modernity they too have an ancient genealogy. In 
the seventh book of his Natural Hist01'Y Pliny described a large number of 
monstrous races: the Cynocephali or Dog-Heads; the Blemmyae (Othello's 
"men whose heads/Do grow beneath their shoulders") j the Astomi or Apple-
Smellers, mouthless men who live by smell and vvill die of a bad odor; the Scio-
pods, who shield themselves from the sun "vith a foot grown to gigantic pro-
portions; and such lesser marvels as Pygmies, Ethiopians and Amazons. In 
compiling his list Pliny drew, as usual, upon a wide range of sources, and he 
passed on to his future readers a legacy rich in both imaginative possibilities and 
(; Marjorie Perloff, Frank Q'Hcrra: Poet among Painters (New York: George 
Braziller, 1977), pp. xiii-xiv. 
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intellectual difficulties, an inheritance made all the more interesting for containing 
a grain (but only a grain) of truth. 
It is the project of Friedman's book to explore the medieval fortuna of 
tIus legacy, and he has produced an account that will remain definitive for many 
years to come. Tlus is an achievement that is all the more remarkable in view of 
the problems with which his study \vas faced. The exoticism of the monstrous 
races, as well as their essentially textual existence, condemned them to a marginal 
life in the l\tliddle Ages. They cling precariously not only to the edges of 
maps, manuscripts and sculptured buildings but also to the intellectual life of 
the time: there are, on Friedman's evidence, only a very few treatises and not 
a single work of what we would now call "imaginative literature" devoted 
specifically to the races. Paradoxically, however, this apparent irrelevance allows 
them to be ubiquitous throughout more weighty productions, as if their marginality 
rendered them expendable and therefore irresistible. Moreover, the subject 
cannot be contained within obvious bibliographical categories but inhabits the 
interstices of modern taxonomies, shading off first in one direction and then in 
another. As if this were not enough, medieval people never quite agreed on 
what they thought about the races. As Friedman mildly says, "Our subject is 
so broad that it generated many inconsistencies, as do most long-lived issues 
in cultural history." Nor can these inconsistencies be accounted for chrono-
logically: despite occasional efforts to trace an historical development, especially 
in manuscript illumination, Friedman is too precise a scholar to force his 
material onto a procrustean historical grid. 
The problems, then, are formidable, and it is perhaps inevitable that they have 
been only partially overcome. On the positive side, the research behind this book 
is astonishing in its reach and depth. There are not many -scholars with the 
industry and equipment to move confidently through the vast ranges that this 
book surveys. Travel literature, Ethiopic manuscripts, Noachid and Macrobian 
maps, scholastic sunmlae, universal chronicles, pastoral manuals, Gothic tympanea, 
Latin lexicography, Floi1'e et Blancbefieur-all this (and Beowu.lf too) is grist for 
Friedman's mill. The citations are a cornucopia of exotica, with the Nieder-
sachsisches Jahrbuch fur Landesgescbichte sandwiched between the Journal and 
Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and Historie, Jyske Samlinger of 
Denmark. In this company a reference to P MLA seems flighty and one to the 
Sunday Times Magazine of January 13, 1980 positively madcap. But let me not 
sound ungrateful, for it is hard to imagine a scholar who could not learn much 
from the sheer mass of material that is here assembled. 
But the very process of compilation has its own temptations, and occasionally 
the book seems more a triumph of the index card than an act of mind. It must 
be admitted that the pleasures of readership arc pretty sparse, and a perhaps 
unavoidable aridity is not helped by a relentlessly solemn tone. Moreover, the 
book has some organizational tangles that inhibit easy comprehension. The 
medieval debate about the human status of the monstrous races, and about 
their raison d'hre in the divine scheme of things, is of course basic to the entire 
subject, but despite previous, fragmentary references, only in the final chapter 
(number 9) is it treated in any detail. Furthermore, tllls discussion is itself 
closely related to the genealogy of the races and to their function as prodigies 
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and manifestations of the 'divine mIl, topics surveyed in the distant chapters 5 
and 6. Again: monsters in travel literature are discussed in both chapters 4 and 
7, while their moralization is surveyed in both chapters 6 and 7. In sum, the 
reader needs not merely agile fingers but the mental ability to reconstitute the 
wholeness of the subject from what seem like dismembered parts. Might it 
not have been better to have focused on individual works in their entirety, 
even if the monstrous races figure only partially? Then we would have had 
both a full account of the place of the races in such texts as Thomas of 
Cantimpn!'s De N aturis Rerum, M'arco Polo's Description of the World, Beowulf, 
Mandeville's Travels and the Alexander Romances, as well as an analysis of the 
thematic imperatives that led each -of these works toward the attitudes it 
displays. As it is, we learn what each author thought of the races but not 
why, a sad incompletion that prevents us from fully understanding the role 
these creatures played in the medieval consciousness. 
That they did indeed play is clear from the many citations that stress the 
sheer entenainment value of this exotic fauna, and many -of the reproductions 
show these creatures proudly displaying their monstrosity. This is not an aspect 
of their appeal that much attracts Friedman--lhe seems almost irritated by such 
merriment, as if it bespeaks a slighting attitude that would reduce the races to 
mere baubles of the imagination. He argues that the races' existence is ultimately 
grounded in historical fact: Ethiopians and Pygmies are of course real Mrican 
peoples, Amazons "reflect the customs of matriarchal societies," giants "may 
well describe the Watsui," Cynocephali may be based on baboons or anthropoid 
apes, and the Blemmyae would seem to have been an Ethiopian tribe who 
perhaps used shields or bucklers ornamented with a face. Armed with these 
hypotheses, Friedman then takes medieval commentators to task for their 
blatant ethnocentrism, a charge that really comes to constitute the book's major 
argument. But of course this is a point that is too easily scored. Even if we 
grant the validity of his rationalizing hypotheses (a large admission), we must 
surely recognize that for all but a very few Europeans the races had only a 
textual life. It was not that observers preferred debasing stereotypes to the true 
evidence but that they had no evidence at all. So it seems unfair, for instance, 
that Augustine should be criticized for not approaching the question of the 
races' genealogy "as a natural scientist would" since a natural scientist would 
(one hopes) never have asked the question at all. Similarly, Albert the Great 
is berated for his ethnocentric description of the Pygmies (including his un-
willingness to "concern himself with the possible existence of a native Pygmy 
ars") while Peter of Auvergne is praised for being "more empirical." But 
apparently neiciler Alben nor Peter had ever seen a single Pygmy, nor a 
Pygmy artifact, a deficiency that renders the concept of natural science irrelevant. 
But other, compelling criteria surely are relevant, especially those imperatives of 
the imagination familiar to us from medieval grotesqueries like the fatrasie, 
fabliaux, and sermons joyeux. Had Friedman turned his attention towards tlus 
disreputable line of thought he would doubtless have had trenchant things to say, 
as his fascinating comments on manuscript illumination testify. 
In sum, then, this is a book loaded with information, somewhat confusingly 
organized and with a central analytic tool (ethnocentrism) that is not up to 
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its task. But what is perhaps most important is that the book offers not just 
valuable lmowledge about the Middle Ages but sustenance for psyches starved 
by the bloodless fantasies of the contemporary media. 
The Johns Hopkins University 
LEE W. PATIERSON 
The Anti-Theatrical P,'ejudice by Jonas Barish. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 
The University of California Press, 1981. Pp. x + 499. $24.50. 
A book of paradoxes, which begin with the title: the anti-theatrical prejudice. 
TIus describes both interwoven intentions of the book. "Anti-theatricality" is 
a Lovejovian unit idea, the first to emerge in fresh and clear delineation for a 
very long time. And it is traced, anatomized, lrnit into the necessary knots of 
complication by a philologian whose skill, scope and patience arc worthy of 
the Lovejovian legacy. "Prejudice" is descriptive of an apparently antithetical 
act of metahistorical explanation: it describes a psychological continuum which 
merges all of the carefully reasoned or rationalized debates of a millenium or 
so into the irrationality of a given, ancient fear. 
As one would expect from a distinguished historical critic of the drama, 
The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice incorporates, encompasses the concerted attacks 
upon the staging of plays in ,ancient Rome, in Medieval England, in the Puritan 
assaults upon Shakespeare and his fellows, in Collier's war upon their successors, 
in the Jansenist and Rousseau-inspired forays in France. These oft-told tales 
of the theater and its enemies are extended to Platonic beginnings and to later 
echoes. But Barish refocuses them as counters in a bigger game, as inevitable 
episodes in the history of the idea of anti-theatricality. Let him clarify the 
distinction in a statement or two from one of his finest sections, that on the 
Maximes and Refiexions diverses: II La Rochefoucauld's account is probably 
the most totally unfavorable one can find anywhere, even from among the 
enemies of the theater ... it diagnoses in implicitly antitheatrical tenus a social 
and psychological malady without reference to the theater at all. La Roche-
foucauld is not thinlong about the stage, but about the stagey quality of life in 
urban Paris ... of a lasting dilemma, of which the theater cannot in any case 
be more than a symptom" (219). Well, perhaps a bit more: the history will 
always return to the stage as its focus. But the socia-psychological interpreter, 
co-author in a single skin with the dramatic historian, will respond repeatedly 
that this is owing to the depth at which the prejudice has been established. It 
is too dangerous often to emerge undisguised, to emerge as something more 
puritanical in its anxiety than a desire to purge the theaters and their socially 
disastrous denizens, the actors and the audiences (the latter split between victims 
from those intellectual provinces governed by a repressive establishment, and 
the victimizers who would lead them from labor to pleasure, to fantasy fleshed 
Out). A naked instance of the confusion is offered by Barish in a letter 
published as a pamphlet in 1730 against the opening of a new theater in Good-
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man!s Fields. The author is a (putative) silk merchant who ticks off items 
toward the religious and personal degeneration of the laboring ~lass which will 
ensue. But the conclusion cuts close to home: the country wIll lose two or 
three hundred thousand pounds from the distraction, and worse, will lose it 
because the theater is in the very heartland of London's silk trade: '" Tis ... in 
the Interest of our Country, that effectual Care be taken, that those concern'd 
in the making of SilJ~s should be constant in their Labour ... should live as 
cheap as conveniently, they can .... nOt\Vithstanding this, shall we carry Idleness, 
Debaucbery, and expensive Diversions into that Qua1·ter of the Town which is 
concerned in this very Trade!" Cpp. 241-42). Here the displacement of guilt 
upon the theater is merely Marxist, socially severe but historically fleeting. As 
such, it represents a middle stage (as do so many of Barish's anti-theatrical 
documents) between attacks upon the theatre in its essence and attacks which 
evince more perennial prejudice. 
Like all grand ideational ventures, this one can be viewed as another footnote 
to Plato, with whose primitivism and conservative resistance to change it begins. 
Or, more profitably, as a commentary upon an idea which is commentary or 
companion to the Great Chain of Being (which Lovejoy, after all, found devel-
oped out of the paradoxes inherent in Aristotle's discoveries about Plato). 
Stability, the state, the immutability of form among the gods-these were major 
reasons for Plato's walling the poets, with their tales and art of metamorphosis, 
outside the idealized hierarchy of his state. But with plenitude came temptation. 
The Romans, with a crazed appetite for the theatre, countered it by casting the 
actor out of a share in the rights of citizenship with real statutes and abuse 
unmatched in Plato's societal blueprint for perfection. The middle ages, building 
out of the Tertullian excesses of the patristic fountainhead, castigated playing in 
such extreme attacks upon the pleasure principle as the Lollard treatise of 
miraclis pleyinge, yet allowed this rival pulpit to function as an instrument of the 
church. It was Plato's Florentine advocates and interpreters in the Renaissance 
who in his name embraced change, Proteus and the chameleon as images of 
aspiration endorsed change, and as possibility rather than revolt (the actor implicit 
in Pico's vision of man in the Oration becomes the explicit protagonist of Vives' 
Fable). The paradox of Lovejoy's ladder has been transferred by these metaphors 
to the theatrum 'I1mndi where we rediscover the end result of Aristotelian 
plenitude and the early neoplatonic metaphysics of emanation when they are set 
against primitive Platonism: "In onc case we seem to have an ideal of stasis, in 
the other an ideal of movement, in one case an ideal of rectitude, in the other 
an ideal of plenitude" (117). 
As Barish's exhaustive history moves on, the former ideal becomes motivation 
for attacks upon the theater as place and profession-his best sections are upon 
Prynne, the Jansenist extremists, Nietzsche's revulsion against Wagner. The 
latter becomes the ground for the sporadic defenses, the "countercurrents," 
such as Adam Smith's optimistic positioning of "spectatordom at the heart of 
the moral experience," a "view of the moral life as a genteel theater of self-
correcting passions" (244, 255). But as one moves with more sophisticated (or, 
at least, wider-ranging) speculators from the stage proper into the social 
theater, change, the source of Renaissance optimism, turns upon man to cut 
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through the layers of ego and reveal an empty center the discovery of which is 
suicidal in its consequences. 
What is theatricality? Mimicry: being another, deception, valuing the 
potential for change in material surfaces over the unchanging invisibles which 
include the soul, the self, one's very II calling" into a place commensurate with 
God's (and society's) structure of things. Or exhibitionism: truth carried to 
extremes, the seed flaunted into a flower of behavior, costume, diction so 
artificially over-nurtured that it threatens to break the stalk 055ff.). Pico, 
supreme exhibitionist in presenting his autobiographical self as metaphor for 
Man, had defended mimicry as natural to our state, hence no deception. Half 
a century later this Florentine tradition would be derar.efied, scattered to the 
street bookstalls in the myriad metamorphoses of Gelli's Circe. And the 
phase of glorification for the exhibitionist aspect of man as actor, always a bit of a 
poseur even in his rightful domain, would be codified in 11 cortegiano, the first 
seriously probing handbook on self-presentation in everyday life at court. 
Others, the anti-materialists, would look harder at mutability. The seventeenth-
century Jansenists began seriously questioning the impact of imitation upon the 
actor's life, and La Rochefoucauld would cap a tradition (Gracian in Spain; 
Daniel Dyke-The Mystery of Self-Deceiving-in England) which extended these 
explorations to the whole deplorable condition of mankind. We disguise before 
others disguise the passions until vicious motives appear virtues, disguise so 
continually that we finally" come to form our own best audience, and are most 
completely taken in by our own act. Our efforts ... amount to a prolonged 
essay in self-deception .... This is a ... radical version of the theatrical theory 
of personality ... since it introduces the idea of inadvertent theatricality" (213). 
From this point Barish's history moves through the optimistic· (because melior-
istic) attacks upon theater in Diderot into the radical theory of Rousseau whose 
rejection of representation leads him nostalgically to foresee a return to ur-
historical mythic, religious events: "total participation, the breaking down 
of the arbitrary barrier between stage and audience. All the actors now 
spectators, and all the spectators actors. No one any longer represents anyone 
other than himself" (290). A long century later Nietzsche will imagine that 
this was the Dionysian world of pre-Socratic, pre-Sophoclean Greek drama 
(420ff.); Attaud would still later envision this past as furore in the theater of 
cruelty (455). 
There is a chapter (ambivalent, less bold with the evidence than most) on 
Ben Jonson's quarrel with his own profession which epitomizes a recurrent 
phenomenon which Barish emphasizes: the frequency with which dramatists 
(Plato, Gosson, Calderon, Racine, Rousseau) come to reject the theater. It 
is a phenomenon analogous to a basically Romantic movement which Barish 
shrewdly traces from Lamb's argument that Shakespeare is too potentCial) for 
the kinetic reduction of staging (Byron ultimately wrote dramas calculated to 
make staging impossible) into the heart of the English professor today (repre-
sented, in a cruelly just chapter, by Yvor Winters). The theater against itself, 
as with the ancient Romans. It seduces them, us, with an indispensable window 
:upon the self, upon ourselves. as Protean, chameleon-like, in the end self-
deceivers looking fo~ a role as well as an author. So the Roman, the Elizabethan 
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socially disallow the actor as a scapegoat, even as their persistent need prods 
the theater to heightened accomplishments. Perhaps, Barish speculates of the 
great periods of dramatic creation, "the drama was able to do what it did in 
these epochs because of the intense level of moral awareness in the community 
at large, which found its direct and unmediated expression in the tracts of the 
antitheatricalists, its more complex and discriminating expression in the drama 
itself. A climate of intense moral energy. that is, may have helped nurture both 
the successes of the theater and the virulence of the campaigns against it" 
(192) . 
This suggests an extreme of ambivalence strong and historically persistent 
enough to be described as a love-hate interaction between man the actor and 
the theater which stages the drama of his changes; it was not accidental that 
Aristotle observed peripety at the heart of the matter. Proteus the optimist's 
god; Circe the fearful materialist's witch. Implicitly (sometimes they surface) 
adopting the implications of the imagery, Barish embeds the idea of anti-
theatricality in the psychology of fear, of .. prejudice." And the larger fear 
is sexual-fear of surrender to, seduction by the otherness of the female. In 
Prynne's Histriomastix, Barish observes, the emphasis is "obsessively on sexuality 
and effeminacy, as though to underscore the author's fearful aversion to any thing-
dancing, love-making, hair-curling, elegant attire-that might suggest active or 
interested sexuality, this being equated with femininity, with wealmess, with the 
yielding to feeling, and consequently with the destruction of all assured props and 
boundaries" (85). .. As plays mean love, so love means women, and women, in 
turn, mean actresses" (282). Barish is here paraphrasing Rousseau, but one recalls, 
too, the excitement and disturbance of the Restoration theater when Nell Gwynne 
and the others escaped tradition and social hierarchy onto the stage, even into 
the anomalous excitement of breeches roles (Katharine Maus's 1979 essay in ELR 
on "Sexual Ideology and the Restoration Actress" is an incisive addendum to 
Barish's argument). The theater as Circe, the seductress, offering to change us 
into our morc sensual potentialities; mimic and exhibitionist offering us a glimpse 
at another self-which would, of course, undermine any such stable concept as 
self itself as some center of things. Misogyny, like the theater, then, is-to return 
to Lovejoy's original paradox-a fear of plenitude as it is found in the fantasy. 
A final chapter both narrows and extends this grand example of prejudice by 
likening the anti-theatrical fundamentalist with the antisemite, manioheans both 
(on an easier scale than the daily threatened misogynist). This, too, is historically 
justified: "At the time of the Revolution ... in France, when the National 
Assembly carne to address itself to the cause of certain persecuted minorities, 
it debated the Jewish question and the case of the actors at the same time" 
(465); "What good actor today is not-a Jew? The Jew as a born 'man of 
letters,' as the true master of the European press, also exercises his power by 
vinue of his histrionic gifts; for the man of letters is essentially an actor: He 
plays the 'expert,' the 'specialist.'" So Nietzsche in The Gay Science (467). 
A book of paradoxes. A major dramatic critic's defense of the theater against 
critics of its existence and essence from Plato to Winters, against self-under-
mining dramatists such as Peter Handke. A defense, too, against prejudice, 
prejudice against Jews, woman, pleasure set into historical and structural juxta-
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position with the anti-theatrical prejudice. Barish is not immune, of course, to 
the attitudes he is describing, sometimes becoming the demonstration of his own 
argument. It is his world, with which he is engaged in often strident argu-
ment (the over-heightened moments are frequently punctuated with the 
adjectives" bizarre" and" lunatic" applied to his cast of polemicists) that can 
stumble into such self-revelation and perhaps unconscious validation of his thesis 
as this: "If men are to realize their full potential, then, even within the theater, 
they must first face up to the demon of theatricality in themselves and find waY!i 
of exorcising it .... The very nature of the theater brings out the WOfst in itS 
votaries, and turns its aesthetic triumphs into human defeats" (348). Barish is 
anatomising the idea of theatricality he and we have used to skewer all the 
fringes of social and psychic life which threaten, yet are central to the pre-
occupations, nourishment, desire of the western male. Or II man," as he defined 
himself-a flexible phenomenon whose potential was described in Pico della 
Mirandola's Oration, is embodied in the actor, and has always been feared most 
by himself when he has rediscovered the theatricality with which it replaces the 
assumption of self, discovers plenitude flooding the breakwaters of rectitude. 
This is finally an engaged book. Pedagogical father to children of the sixties 
and seventies, Barish is afraid and unafraid of what he sees. He closes with the 
psychoanalyst Robert Lifton's examination of the radically discontinuous lives 
of a young Japanese made in the image of Hiroshima's apocalyptic fragments. 
A dubious source, perhaps, but offering a case history recognizable from a 
multitude of unfulfilled metamorphoses we could all produce as evidence from 
the last fifteen years to support what Barish calls" the intrusion into our language 
of a newly approving view of acting and spectatordom" (472) through which 
"We have given up rectitude for plenitude, and Qur deeply lodged antithea-
tricalism is rising up to reproach us for it" (473). Things have gone awry; 
and brilliant as Beckett's drama of watchful waiting may be, Barish believes it 
will be a rhetoric of optimism more rooted in the psyche's long-practiced controls 
which will dominate the future as we return to an "addiction to story-telling, 
[the] love of gorgeous spectacle, sumptuous rhetoric, and all the vulgar panoply" 
(464). An uncertain sermon about the ambivalences theatricality has fostered 
in the author's own psyche; a description of the disasters it has fostered in the 
next generation or two. And a promise or prayer for a confused future whose 
participants have been taught to project themselves into the theatrical possibilities 
which Pica projected for a morc assured culture whose historical rise and fall 
from innocence to sophistication and back again Barish has traced in this classic 
extension of the history of our ideas. 
JACKSON I. CoPE 
University of Southern California 
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Narrative and its Discontents: Problems of Closure in tbe Traditional Novel 
by D. A. Miller. Prince~on: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. xv + 300. 
$20.00. 
Closure in the Novel by Marianna Torgovnick. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981. Pp. x + 238. $16.50. 
One of the notable features of literary criticism in the past two decades has 
been its concern with endings. Apocalypse or telos, closure or abyss, bang or 
whimper, the end of the literary work or process has commanded the attention 
once paid to the beginning, the middle, or the organic whole. It is a sign of 
these end times that Princeton University Press has published in the same year 
two books on '" closure" in the novel. One of them is a challenging contribution 
to the theory of narrative and to the practice of the close reading of prose 
fiction. The other is a more pragmatic and elementary study of how a variety 
of novelists bring their novels to more or less successful resolutions. 
D. A. Miller's N crrrative and its Discontents is concerned with a contradiction 
at the heart of story-telling, a contradiction between the story's drive toward 
resolution of conflict, mystery, or abberation at its end and its need to 
cultivate and promote these instabilities if it is to proceed at all. Where 
other critics have insisted upon the primacy or adequacy of the eventual closure 
(or, in reaction, have privileged a supposedly modern resistance to closure of 
any kind), I\1iller argues that "closure" and "narratability" are essentially in-
congruous systems in the text. Focussing on three quite different representatives of 
the nineteenth-century novel, Jane Austen, George Eliot, and Stendhal, he demon-
strates how "the suspensive and dispersive logic of narrative is such that an 
effective closure-no matter how organically it emerges from the story-always 
stands in a discontinuous (or negative) relation to it" (p. 189). 
The theoretical basis of l\1iller's argument is provided by Freud, though 
Miller is not a psychoanalytic critic in the usual sense of the term. Rather he 
draws on Freud's insights into the antithetical and ambivalent constructs of 
human desire to clarify and focus his analysis of the twists and turns of plot, 
character and narrative point of view. Miller also draws with tact and 
discrimination on French post-structuralism and narratology, entering into valu-
able dialogue with critics like Roland Barthes, Gerard Genette, and Rene Girard. 
In some ways, Narrative and its Discontents, with its awareness of the self-
contradiction of literary texts, participates in the critical enterprise of decon-
struction, but the book is more genuinely historical and cross-cultural than 
most deconstructive analyses. It balances the claims of the U traditional novel" 
of the nineteenth century against the claims of the modernizing critiques of the 
twentieth. It also sets up an illuminating exchange between the English moral 
and the French h1l11loraliste sensibilities. Not only are we invited to compare, 
as versions of closure, Austen's goal of moral propriety and Stendhal's of 
II erotic bliss," but we are offered a series of brief comparisons and contrasts 
involving Zola, Flaubert, Balzac, Dickens, and James. In a concluding tour de 
force, Miller brings together Scott and Sade to illustrate the interlocking con-
traries of law and desire in the novel. 
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The theoretical ~Han of l\!1iller's book is finally less impressive, however, than 
the discipline and sensitivity of its particular readings. The general problem of 
closUIe is an enabling condition for a series of specific and various insights into 
such novels as Emma, Middlemarch, and Le Rouge et Ie N oir, into characters, 
scenes, and authorial discourse on events. It is the kind of argument that invites 
extensive quotation and resists brief summary. With Austen, Miller treats the 
major novels synoptically, showing how the" novelistic imagination" of characters 
like Emma and Mary Crawford intersects with the moral propriety of figures 
like Knightley and Fanny Price without ever being resolved or contained 
by the agents or the terms of closure. Miller does not deny that the 
moral standards of society are finally affinned, but he shows how the affirmation 
is dramatized as the creative work of individual characters in the novels. With 
Eliot, Miller deals with Middlemarch alone, but shows that there are markedly 
different levels in the novel on which noticeably different balances are struck 
between historical unfolding and ideological arrest. At the level of the com-
munity, all uncertainty is immediately and prejudicially laid to rest; at the level 
I of individuals, the" fantasy of foreclosure" Cp. 138) is subject to various kinds of 
I reopenings; at the level of the narrative persona, whom Miller insists on 
treating as masculine and discussing under the rubric "God," the allegiance to 
continuation all but undoes the possibility of an ending. With Stendhal, most 
of the discussion focuses on Le Rouge et Ie N oir and the unfinished Lucien Leuwen. 
As Miller sees it, "Stendhalian narrative always constitutes itself as a prolonged 
act of resisting authority, as an evasion from the incompletely sealed space of 
its immobilizing domination!l Cp. 258). Stendhal continually frustrates the 
consummation of the well-made plot, but can only do so by conjuring up 
its authority in advance. 
Thus if Miller gives us an Austen less firmly and completely in control of 
her narrative than is usually taken to be the case, he also gives us a Stendhal 
who is less liberated from the authoritarian controls he seeks to subvert. It is not 
surprising to find an Eliot selfconscious and self-critical of her narrative authority, 
but IvIiller's analysis of the aesthetic and moral equilibrium of her greatest novel 
is acute and revealing. One might wish for some historical reflection on the 
"traditional novel," some consideration of where it came from in the longer 
cavalcade of fiction and what became of it as it passed into the defile or impasse 
of modernism. But Narrative and its Discontents is an important contribution 
, to our understanding of prose fiction in general and our appreciation in particular 
of some of its most durable practitioners. 
Mariana Torgovnick's Closure in the Novel is aimed at a less scholarly, more 
teacherly audience. It is less informed by critical theory and more concerned 
with perceptions available to the "ordinary reader," with "the natural empathy 
that even sophisticated readers can be made to feel for characters as represen-
tations of human beings" Cp. 207). Where IvIiller sees narrative caught in an 
aesthetic and psychological double bind, Torgovnick asserts the potential integrity 
of an author's moral intentions and the novel's formal realization of them. In 
effect, in her claims for the "honest," "valid," H healthful," and "successful" 
endings to be found in many works of nineteenth-century fiction, Torgovnick 
takes for granted the very ideology of closure in the "traditional novel" that 
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.Miller calls into question in his book. It is unfortunate for the values and 
methods that Torgovnick is trying to promote that the contest is so unequal. na 
The weakness in Torgovnick's analysis stems from her divided allegiance 
between a Jamesian concern with the formal shape of a novel and a neo- lit 
Aristotelian concern with the author's persuasive intentions. It is not- that such T, 
concerns are incapable of integration at some level, but in Torgovnick's expression 
of them there is a noticeable gap bet\Veen formal description of a novel and 
evaluation of the thematic content of an author's ideas. On the one hand, 
Torgovnick provides a rudimentary poetics of novelistic closure, arranging four 
sets of terms under the controlling opposition of "epiloque" and "scene." On 
the other hand, she refers both to the novels and to other sources for a 
relatively independent assessment of what meanings or attitudes the author wants 
to convey. "Since an ending is the single place where an author most pressingly 
desires to make his points, ... extratextual information and statements of 
intention are often extremely helpful," she argues (p. 19). At; a result of these 
divergent interests, Torgovnick uses her own formal tenns in a half-hearted 
and apologetic fashion at the same time that she engages in a thematic criticism 
of an elementary sort, uncomplicated by the aesthetic mediation of philosophical 
purpose. The tension between these criteria is dramatized in statements like 
the following on the ending of Middlemarch: "though Eliot begins with what 
looks like the conventional after-history, she invests the fonn with at least some 
aesthetic value, and with considerable philosophic value" (p. 34). The assess-
ments of an author's general ideology are often sound, but they too quickly 
abandon the more hesitant discussion of specific structures of closure. Further-
more, as in this quotation, positive aesthetic value is often established merely by 
contrasting it to "cheap romantic fiction" and "purely conventional novels" 
(p. 37). 
T orgovnick does deal more specifically and literally than lVliller with the 
concluding pages of the novels she treats, but she also tries to cover a great 
deal of ground. She discusses some seventeen novels by nine different authors, 
running chronologically from Vanity Fair to Light in August. James receives 
the most attention, a synoptic chapter on the endings of his novels up through 
The Ambassadors and a separate chapter on The Golden Bowl, and it is with 
James' own finely wrought fabric of aesthetic and moral values that Torgovnick 
achi~ves her most persuasive interpretative results. She clearly appreciates his 
sceruc form of closure most highly, and her discussion of the enigmatic" gestural 
code" (p. 148) of The Golden Bowl is revealing. Her discussion of the evasive 
conclusions of Vanity Fair and L'Education senti111entale is also clear-headed. 
although she is decidedly out of sympathy with such a sense of an ending. 
"These endings are the product of bitter men, who suppress the kind of 
~annth and fellow feeling that Eliot, Dickens, Tolstoy, and even Hawthorne 
display toward their characters," Torgovnick writes in a sentence that reveals a 
good deal about her book (p. lIS). But with the less clearly defined endings 
of no~els li.ke Middlemarch, WaT and Peace, The Scarlet Letter, The Waves, 
a~d Ltght. tn August, she repeatedly displaces considerations of narrative fonn 
~~. consl,deratio.ns of id~ological intent. Only in the case of Bleak House 
( lckens ... philosophy IS not very subtly nuanced and is not always clearly 
--.. 
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reflected in his novels" [po 58]) does the ideological arrow seem to miss the 
narrative mark. 
It may be that there is an undivided sense of story somewhere in our 
literary tradition, where beginning, middle and end live happily ever after. But 
Torgovnick's common-sense assurance that it can be found in the great novels 
of nineteenth-century tradition is much less compelling than Miller's contrary 
diagnosis of the hamartia at the heart of such splendid fabulation. 
WALTER L. REED 
University of Texas 
The Life in the Fiction of Ford M. Ford by Thomas C. Moser. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1980. Pp. xix + 349. $22.50, cloth; $8.50, paper. 
Assuming that biography is a valid entry into a writer's ''lork, one could scarcely 
imagine a better subject than he who, as a little boy, woke in he middle of the 
night to find himself "~ucking the end of a burnt match." Ford Madox Ford 
(born Hueffer) would supposedly remember this event all his life and still be 
haunted by this and related images until he was an old man. This is the kind of 
detail that Thomas C. Moser has intelligently brought up of the morass of 
trivia that comprises anybody's life, and he returns to it periodically to demon-
strate its broadening significance. 
Ford was an unhappy, anxiety-ridden child, preoccupied with feelings of 
intellectual and physical inferiority with respect to his brother. Moser demon-
strates convincingly how the troubled child grows into the ill-confident man, 
who pushes every important male friendship to the breaking point and doubts 
the love both given and received bet\veen him and his female friends. Certainly 
Ford's most crucial relationship for the history of literature is that with Joseph 
Conrad. I found Moser's treatment of this excellent. I was moved by the 
genuine tenderness that grew up between these nvo workhorses and the sweet 
intimacy with which they watched one another work. The break is admirably 
recounted. Moser is successful in suggesting that the combination of inferiority 
and jealousy that led to Ford's break with Conrad set a pattern that Ford would 
follow throughout his life. 
The question I cannot help raising now, however, is the one I set aside at the 
beginning. How much stock can "\ve put in literary biographies? The genre 
seems to rest upon a tacit assumption that anything written or said or done by 
the man who wrote these great works will have a definite relevance to these 
works and their interpretation. Now, modern criticism has taught us that the 
subject speaking in the writing of a novel is not the same as the historical author's 
subject as he lives and works. Art takes place precisely in the discrepancy 
between the historical subject and the subject of the writing. 
As I have said, my reservations were gladly put aside in this case, as I 
thought that Ford would be one literary personage who warranted biographical 
treatment. But I must confess here that, despite some fine qualities of Moser's 
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book, Ford's life becomes dull and repetitious, and the relevance of his life to 
his work apears thinner and thinner as we go along. The Good Soldier is too 
great and complex a book to be subjected to total biographical determinism, 
as in this statement: U Ford's inability to accept his own sexuality and his 
resultant guilt and unhappiness are, of course, what make Ashburnham's story 
so sad and The Guud Suldier so great" (p. 226). I find that "of course" 
particularly vexing since through much of the boob: Moser does not insist on 
the determinism. Instead, one imagines a very genial guided tour through 
Fordian memorabilia. Here and there a reflection between life and work. 
But whenever he starts a search for the U sources" of this character or that in 
Ford's life, I take up my defenses. Mter all, given a few basic variations, allY 
fictional character can seem to have been inspired from nearly any historical 
personage. Moser's efforts to draw precise parallels appear, by the end of the 
book, simply ludicrous. 
Within the admittedly hallowed tradition of the literary biography, I also find 
certain weaknesses in Moser's generally sound treatment. First of all, the book 
is too chronological for my taste. Ford's life is, from the vantage point of the 
fiction, simply too tedious before The Goud Suldier. A biography of the master 
of the "time shift" would cenainly warrant, it seems to me, a bit of dabbling 
with chronology. 
For the same reason, the amount of detail is excessive. I found myself wantif:lg 
more when Moser gave us the account of Ford's writing of The Good Soldier 
and less when we learned of the writing of, say, The Simple Life Limited. The 
irony of the method is that, as I will elaborate below, once he arrives at the 
masterpiece, the biographical parallels don't seem to make much difference. 
There's too much to say about the an. 
It is laudable that Mr. Moser allows himself to speculate on Ford's unconscious. 
He presents with deftness the idea that Conrad and Arthur Marwood are each for 
Ford father-figures, and that Ford's idolization of them at different points 
was a displacement of his frustrated love for the father who never tired of 
calling Ford a "stupid little donkey." Moser never ventures, however, to take 
stock of larger chunks of the life in Freudian terms. And with a man who 
had at least two major nervous breakdowns, such an overview would surely 
seem justified. 
The pity with a book so firmly grounded in biographical determinism is that 
Moser is a critic with genuine sensitivity to the nuances of Ford's craft. The 
best part of the book is Chapter IV, in which Moser treats The Good Soldier 
in detail, textually. Here he chooses only the most general parallels between 
life and work-and ones which prove truly revelatory. Moser tells us, for 
instance, of Ford's quest at the time of The Good Soldier for tranquillity. His 
personal life had made him feel that social relations are just the monumental 
mystery they appear to be to John Dowell, the narrator of his novel. Along 
with tranquillity, it is oblivion that crops up again and again in his letters at 
this time-oblivion most of all of his experiences leading to mental illness. Mr. 
Moser suggests helpfully that tranquillity and oblivion become the conditions 
that carryover from the life to the work. And The Good Soldier is certainly 
a story about Dowell's frustrated quest for tranquillity and his ultimate desire 
to get it all down on paper so he can erase it from his mind. 
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Even more significant, Moser contributes an important chapter in that 
II history of literary impressionism (which) remains to be written." He shows 
how tightly woven are theory and practice when it comes to The Good Soldier. 
He clarifies through concrete examples what Ford meant by such things as 
II interest," "exaggeration" and the II right word." The treatment of impression-
ism in The Good Soldier is critically so interesting that it really lifts the book 
out of its self-declared genre. It occurs to me that Moser has more valuable 
observations to offer us along the lines of practical criticism and that perhaps he 
ought to write an extended, even book-length, analysis of The Good Soldier. 
Of particular interest in this light is the analysis of Ford's use of bright 
colors in his major works. Although critics have associated the use of colors 
by writers like Crane with the impressionist painters' divisionist brushstrokes, 
very little has been written on Ford's color sense. Moser makes a fine case for 
color as being one of the major and more subtle means of signification within 
Ford's works. 
What, then, is the value in reading the life to discover how it is reflected 
in the works? I suppose no one would argue that there is any value in it beyond 
that of acquiring broad, detailed biographical data on Ford. The parallels do 
not illuminate the works. Yet the book provides some excellent insights, in spite 
of the biography, into Ford's craftsmanship. 
One could imagine a "critical biography" of Ford that would accomplish a 
more ambitious task-namely, that of demonstrating the development of the 
writer's mind as reflected in the succession of his works. Joseph Frank has set a 
magnificent example of this son of approach to the writer and life in his series on 
Dostoyevsky. I can well imagine a more penetrating treatment ~f Ford, one that 
could show us the relation between the mind that viewed passion as the sole 
experience to be striven for in life and that which saw itself repeatedly abondoned 
"naked beneath the pitiless stars," and how this mental continuity is connected 
to Ford's great novels. 
KEITH CoHEN 
U'I'liversity of Wisconsin, Madison 
Virginia Woolf's Quarrel with Grieving by Mark Spilka. Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1980. pp. xii + 142. $13.50. 
U [Nlothing is more fascinating," Virginia Woolf once wrote, "than to be 
shown the truth which lies behind these immense facades of fiction-if life is 
indeed true, and if fiction is indeed fictitious." She was commenting on her 
strategy of composing Mrs. Dallo'Way, but the remark also seems to justify the 
enormous amount of information about her private life which has become 
available in recent years-not only Quentin Bell's biography, but five volumes 
of letters, a complete set of diaries, several autobiographical essays, and memoirs 
by Leslie Stephen and others. As a result of all this material, a shy, emotionally 
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restrained, uagically suicidal author has become one of the most fascinating 
personalities in contemporary culture, and criticism of her work is likely to 
hayc a psychological slant for some time to come. Few of the psychological 
studies, however, are likely to surpass Mark Spilka's brief, trenchantly written 
ncw book, which looks behind the rather gloomy late-Victorian facade of 
VI Dolfs family and offers a "truthful" narrative to compare with her 
fiction. 
Spilka concentrates his literary analysis on MH. Dallo rJ.)(1Y and To the Light-
home, but he ranges over the author's entire career and biography, constructing 
an argument which has some of the power of a good novel. He shows that 
\Voolfs writing, like that of all the great romantics, provided therapy and con-
solation for her emotional crises; but he also contends that the therapy did not 
go far enough, and that even the best of Woolf's fictions failed to confront or 
understand their personal sources. His point is not that Woolf lacked honcsty-
on the contrary, he demonstrates quite clearly the courage and tenacity of her 
psychological struggles. He is also not saying that Woolf should have been a 
more autobiographical \\'fiter. He merely points out certain weaknesses of 
the fiction as fiction, certain emotional e,'asions which are probably the result 
of the way autobiographical material has been woven into defensive fantasy. By 
this means his book accomplishes what all psychological criticism hopes to achieve 
but seldom docs: it gives a persuasive rationale for the strengths and weaknesses 
of an author's work, and an insight into the \vay literature can relate to an 
elemental human problem. Moreover, Spin.::a suggests that the evasiveness, the 
"prudery and reticence" \vhich sometimes mar Virginia "Voolf's novels, is 
characteristic of our age. Despite our apparcnt liberation from various kinds of 
Victorian repression, we are no better than she was at expressing our grief over 
death. 
The problem of impacted grief may seem an odd thing to discuss in relation 
to Virginia \Voolf, because critics haye long agreed that her novels arc essentially 
elegiac. Her \york could be described as an extended grieving, although Spilka 
com'incingly m:lintains that she left much grieving undone, and hence was 
dis~bled as ;l person and as a writer. I-lis cas~ is all the more persuasive because 
the psychologic3} theory he uses in support of his argument derives from no 
particular schoo}, and is refreshingly free of clinical jargon; he simply believes, 
lil~c 3D)' practically-oriented psychological social workcr, that neurosis or psy-
chosis can result from blocl~cc1 emotion, and he offers plenty of e\-idence from 
\Voolf's biography and noycis to show that she suffered from just such a problem. 
The primary ungrie\-cd c\-cnt in \\'oolf's life was the death of her mother, 
Julia Duckworth Stephen. \Vhcn Virginia \Voolf was thirtcen years old, she was 
led into a family bedroom to yic\\' thc dead mothcr's body. She broke into 
cOlllpulsi\'C bughtcr and hid her face behind her hands. Her reaction was 
troubling enough to be recalled in her di~try almost thirty years later, and 
ulrinutc!;: ~he \\Tote :lbollt it in an alltobiognphical essay (recently published 
in the collection entitled i\loJllcnts of Being). "[\VJas afraid I was not feeling 
enough," :-.he ~.lid in her di:lry, and \\·hen she thought about the cn::1t latcr 
~he L'xpbincd it as a re,lction against the morbid ccremoniousness of Victorian 
death, ur a::. thi.: sign of a dct3chcd arti::.tic temperament which made her analyze 
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rather than feel. The novels, however, indicate a quite opposite temperament; as 
Spilka points out, they are marked by a "compulsive need to cope with death," 
despite the fact that their elegiac tone is muted, as if she were afraid to express 
her mourning directly. 
There were several other funereal occasions in Woolf's life (so many that 
Henry James once described the Stephen family as a "house of all the Deaths "), 
but the first was surely the most traumatic, and was complicated by her 
psychological relationship to both her parents. On the one hand her mother 
had spent years grieving inwardly over the loss of her first husband, Herbert 
Duckworth, and would sometimes lie prostrate on his grave at Orchardleigh. 
To the children, Duckworth semed the perfect romantic lover, and Spilka points 
out that Virginia sometimes had fantasies about him. On the other hand Leslie 
Stephen's first wife had also died; this fact, plus his deep philosophical pessimism, 
made him the perfect companion for Julia Duckworth's sorrow, and bequeathed 
to Virginia at least a sad legacy-what Spilka calls "an undercurrent of romantic 
melancholy and a latent expectation of sudden loss." 
Woolf's mother died at exactly the moment when the girl was entering 
adolescence, and the death had been preceeded by a number of anxious moments 
which Virginia never revealed to her parents: her half brother Gerald Duckworth 
had sexually molested her, and her half sister Laura Stephen was a constant 
reminder of a strain of madness in the family. Spilka is able to link the 
repressed horror, shame, guilt, and anger in the young Virginia to her lack of 
feeling when the mother died. Even more interestingly, he believes she must 
have thought unconsciously that her mother was deserting her in order to join 
a long dead lover. It seems that Virginia imagined, in the midst of the slightly 
hallucinatory, melodramatic ceremony of household grieving over Julia Stephen, 
that she could see a man sitting on the edge of her mother's deathbed. Spilka 
boldly suggests that this figure was none other than Herbert Duckworth, a 
"robber in the bedroom," who had stolen a mother's love from her daughter. 
The "patient ghostly lover," he writes, "became the model for the passion 
Virginia too withheld from all living men, and gave only fleetingly to living 
women .... Thus her lifelong inability to love-to achieve anything like richly 
passionate fulfillment-seems to have been particularly intertwined with her life-
long inability to grieve; and the neglected Duckworth legend-along with the 
now famous triflings of Duckworth's surviving sons-goes a long way toward 
explaining that apparent entanglement." 
Whether Spilka's idea about the "robber" is correct or not, it also helps 
explain certain peculiarities of Woolf's fiction. In her first novel, for example, 
the character of Helen Ambrose is clearly modled on Julia Stephen, but she 
plays a role her real-life counterpart never lived to enact-the nurturing, maternal 
advisor to a sheltered young girl who is fearful and ignorant of sex. In trus 
case it is the girl who dies, improbably contracting a jungle fevcr on the eve of 
her marriage and thus serving as a scapegoat for Woolf herself, who suffered 
considerable anxiety over her own impending marriage, and who attcmpted 
suicide shortly after the publication of the novel. For many years aftcnvard 
Virginia Woolf's mother was to appear regularly in the novels, exerting a 
powerful hold on her daughter'S imagination. There are clements of her in Mrs. 
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Hillbery, in Mrs. Flanders, in Mrs. Dalloway, and of course most of all in 
Mrs. Ramsey, who represents Woolf's most direct attempt to deal v.rith unresolved 
grief. Although Virginia Woolf once wrote that she began To the Lighthouse 
in order to express a vision of her father, it is obviously the mother's death that 
preoccupies her and gives the novel its emotional power. In fact Woolf admits 
in Moments of Being that until she wrote To the Lighthouse she had been 
obsessed by her mother, and that" I suppose I did for myself what psychoanalyists 
do for their patients. I expressed some very long felt and deeply felt emotion." 
Even so, I think Spilka is correct in maintaining that Woolf evades some of 
her most important concerns, presenting Mrs. Ramsey's death indirectly in the 
"Time Passes" section of the novel, and dramatizing grief through the belated 
feelings of a daughter once removed, Lily Brisco, rather than through the actual 
daughter in the fiction, Cam Ramsey. He shows clearly how the novel incor-
porates obsessive material from real life and at the same time acts as a 
defense against that material. Certain painful elements are deferred, withheld, 
or supressed by the fictional structure, which in turn becomes incomplete or 
unsatisfactory on its own terms. Tlus phenomenon is most evident in the 
"Time Passes" section, wIuch Spilka rightly singles out as a major flaw, a 
"precious and pretentious" device that conveys little more than florid mysticism. 
There are two plausible reasons for Woolf's indirect, "poetic" style in the 
middle section of the novel, and they both fuel Spilka's argument about inhibited 
or postponed grief. One of the reasons is social: throughout the composition 
of the novel Virginia \\'oolf worried that critics would accuse her of being 
" sentimental" or "soft"; like some Hemingwayesque tough guy (or like her 
father), she said that she wanted to write a "hard, muscular book." The 
paradox, as Spilka points out, is that by avoiding emotional dangers, by reacting 
against the Victorian gush that surrounded funerals in her cluldhood, she drifted 
into a genteel, evasive, rather kitschy prose that seems quite Victorian indeed. 
The other reason why she was not more direct in rendering a fictional death 
was of course her own personal grief, which at many points she was able to 
meet courageously (after all, the novel remains one of the most effective modern 
elegies), but which she also strategically muffled. At a personal level, the 
partial exorcism of her mother's ghost sems to have left her free enough to 
experience a lesbian flirtation with Vita Sackville-West, and it seems also to 
have opened the way to the more public themes of her later novels; but as 
Spilka notes she remained a "married spinster" who 'vas prone to madness 
and suicide, and the late work never completely forsakes her childhood traumas. 
I have tried to summarize Spilka's argument at length, but I may not have 
done justice to its subtlety and force-in fact I have not even touched on what 
it reveals about Mrs. Dalloway. IvIy only adverse criticism of the book is that 
Spilka's thesis makes him neglect Woolfs late fiction (he has many cogent 
things to say about The Years, but I dunk he undervalues the novel), and I 
hope he will one day do more to fill in the social background towards which 
he often gestures. (Apparently this book is the prelude to a longer study, tenta-
tively called New Literary Quarrels with Tenderness.) Otherwise he has 
written a small masterpiece of Holmesian induction and critical sensitivity. 
Perhaps the greatest compliment I can pay him is to say that Virginia Woolf's 
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Quarrel r..vitb Grieving joins a yery small number of critical books-among them 
Paul Fussell's more ambitious Tbe Great TVa?" and Aloder17 Ale111ory-which I 
have found both enlightening and emotionally moving. 
JAMES NAREMORE 
Indiana University 
Dickinson, The lI1.odern Idiom by David Porter. Cambridge, iVlassachusctts and 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pr. ix + 316. $20.00. 
David Porter's aim in this book is basically threefold: 1) to characterize 
without sentimentality or disdain, his chosen poet's essential oddity as a literary 
figure; 2) to place, critically, her imaginative project in the context of those of 
her time (especially Emerson's and Whitman's); and 3) to make a compelling 
case for her crucial significance as a major precursor of one strain in Modernist 
and postmodern poetry. Relying on an array of critical approaches, including 
textual analysis of manuscripts, close reading, literary biography and history, 
phenomenological and existential speculation, and (discreetly) contemporary 
linguistic deconstruction, Porter works to identify what, exactly, is the structure, 
function, and extent of Emily Dickinson's influence in American literary 
culture of the last century or so. Given such an ambitious undertaking and such 
radically diverse methods of operation, some readers might begin this study \vith 
serious misgivings, only at its completion, I am sure, to smile. 
There is no denying Emily Dickinson's radical "otherncss." She withdrew 
from society in her twenties and rarely venturcd outside her father's house after 
that. What visitors she received she usually entertained through a closed door. 
\iVhen she did meet people face to face, her appearancc was so unusual, 
her conversation and manner so hectic and bizarre, all that her guests 
could remember afterwards was the strain of the meeting on thcm. The poetry 
of this manhcal1y ironic angel is equally" different." It possesses "only three 
or four basic tonal focuses" (p. 15), and thesc are" momcnts of exquisite pleasure, 
most often in nature; fleeting visitations that brush only in an oblique and 
mornentary way the \",illfui strangeness of existence; terrifying assaults that freeze 
the nerves; and, finally, visitations merely wierd, vaguely premonitory. suggestive 
of vaster opacities" (p. 15). These subjects Dickinson embodies in a vcrse :lIsa 
strange. Her modification of the Protestant hymn stanza leans her poetry full 
of "disparate lcxic:lI references," "freakishly precise images," "made-up and 
'\\"illfully gn,mm:'tic:!l compar:ltives" (p. 15). In place of reference to the 
common world and of narrative continuity, she gi\'cs the reader what appears 
to bc dcfecci"e syntax and grammatical nightmares; "unreasonable transpositions. 
extreme ellipsis and lost conn~ctions" (p. 38). 1'0 poetic identity' could 
emerge in sllch lines, despite the striking poetic ,'oicc. \Vhn the reader gers, 
e\'cn Dickinson realizes, is at best'" a supposed person:" ", rhe Representativc 
of thc Verse'" (p. 129). E\'el1 mo~'c odclk, Qinl1 thc fact that she li\'cd to .eee 
the Ci\'il YVar, the opening of the \\'cst~ a~d the gilded age of the robber 
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barons, there is no recognizable history, no social conscience, in her poetry. 
Her poetry simply accumulates her impenetrable aper~us over the years, in poems 
without titles, personal ranlcings, or deeply philosophical credos. And yet, despite 
her alienation from, apparently, everything, Dickinson has provided us with 
some of the finest poems in the language dealing with extreme states of mind: 
"Dissenting, disjunctive, it is language, one begins to sense, covering hysteria .... 
it is language ready to collapse into chaos. Trembling with nervousness and 
need, it performs manically on the brink of the final modernity, silence" Cp. 29). 
In short, a reader discovers in her poetry classics of the modern, hyper-word-
conscious sensibility: "spectacular word displays with hysteria beneath the 
surface" (p. 251). 
Dickinson's art is one of "wil1ful genius," "the mind explosive \vith signifying 
power but disinherited from transcendent knowledge" (p. 15). Living in a 
state of perpetual "afterward," that state of formal feeling after great pain, 
Dickinson tries in her poetry to capture" the visible world" just disappearing, 
H disengaging itself from our sensory receptors." (One thinks of how she 
catches the hummingbird in "A Route of Evanescence.") Since Dickinson's 
subject is the sublimity of language freed from all necessities to refer, her 
subject is "an absence felt as a presence" (p. 32). Hence her images are, 
characteristically, abstract, virtually non-figurative, her rhetoric disjunctive, her 
imaginative stance-one foot over the "Dome of the Abyss" (Poems, # 291). 
As Porter aptly notes, the reader, confronted by such lines is forced either to 
drop the book in despair or, in Dickinson's words, to "fulfill the pantomime 
contained in the words'" (p. 61). Dickinson possesses such a powerful linguistic 
instrument, the "Loaded Gun" of a now famous poem, that she can imagine 
successfully (pace Yvor Winters) the state immediately after death. Style 
precedes meaning in Dickinson (cf. p. 62) in ways eccentrically American. 
Yet this "freedom" is as much privation as po\ver. As I have discussed at 
length elsewhere, Dickinson, lacking a " Monarch" in her life, could not" rule" 
herself: ""VVhen I try to Drganize-my little Force explodes-and leaves me bare 
and charred" (Selected Letters, p. 178). As Porter lucidly describes the 
situation, "The interstice between the self-regarding language and the lived-in 
world is a space of estrangement which produces excitement and a heightened 
sense of both anxiety and observation" (p. 75). The net effect of this situation 
on Dickinson's poetry is that it ends up giving the reader the impression that 
in it " language is speaking itself" (p. 121). The disjunctive, differential, linguistic 
unconscious of the tribe achieves a sublime measure of articulation in Dickinson's 
little stitched-together packets of poetry (cf. p. 121), and so accomplishes the 
almost total "ironicalization of experience" (p. 233). Dickinson's poetic power 
is that of "a language instrument without a conceptual frame, the power of a 
hyperconsciousness and scorching wDrds without a redeeming vision of the world 
or the self" (p. 260). "To fill a Gap/Insert the TIling that caused it-/Block 
it up/With Other-and 'twill yawn the more-/You cannot solder an Abyss/ 
With Air" (Poems, # 546). 
Dickinson's significance for a contemporary audience is, in Porter's view, 
understandably considerable. Underneath the silence of the recluse, the myths 
of the Belle of Amherst, the editorial "corrections" of her texts, the nine-
I 
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tcenth-century conventions of the hymn' form and the' Sunday School topics, 
as well as undernearth the modernist invention of a self-consciously ironic 
rival to John Donne, Emily Dickinson's "poetic identity begins to take form 
in a network of avoidances" (p. 137). Neither a traditionalist nOf a Romantic 
schismatic, Dickinson is the medium, the idiom, of her language, and that 
idiom is the precursor of a "terminal modernism" that now calls itself "post-
modern" -an idiom "artistically pathogenic, deconstructive, hyper-conscious)) 
(p. 238). 
In this respect, Porter's argument for Emily Dickinson's prefigurative status, 
her unconscious anticipation of much in modern and contemporary poetry and 
criticism, has something in common with Sharon Cameron's recently acclaimed 
study Lyric Time. But where Porter and Cameron differ is over the role that 
this American Sibyl characteristically plays. Cameron, stressing the latent 
feminist as well as deconstructive features of her poetry, argues that Dic1dnson 
discovers a special kind of time in her lyrics of rage and radically subversive 
proto-feminist protest. Porter takes a different, broader perspective, seeing in 
Dickinson's poetry the dilemma facing modern poetry as a whole in the 
century. As Wallace Stevens puts that dilemma perfectly in "The American 
Sublime," it is the dilemma of modern poetry's essential poverty of subject 
matter: 
But how does one feel? 
One grows used to the weather, 
The landscape and that; 
And the sublime comes down 
To the spirit itself, 
The spirit and space, 
The empty spirit 
In vacant space. 
Not Emerson's heroically "transparent eyeball" stalking the bare commons, 
not Whitman's autochthonic poet-comrade embracing multitudes, but Dickin-
son's "Pale Reporter from the awful Doors" is the most fitting emblem of 
"post-modenl" American culture (p. 238). If Cameron's study sides too 
strongly with that aspect of Dic1dnson that compellingly expresses a woman's 
imaginative rage, Porter's, echoing Eliot's "Hollow Men" at times, also sees a 
poetry in which there is too much "fear without understanding, force without 
purpose, act without redemptive intention" (261). As such, Porter's book is a 
necessary antidote to Cameron's work. 
Yet Porter recognizes that Dickinson's poetry did activate" a new intelligence" 
still reverberating creatively" in the poetry of our own day" (p. 270). And he 
recognizes, too, sensibly enough, that Dicldnson is not so much a direct 
influence on today's mind as a paradigmatic case prophetic of our time, a 
convenient, ready-made precursor, as it were. Her language "mirrored a 
reality not born. It was a SOIt of x-ray vision that had scanned the future and, 
to the extent it made centerlessness visible, even familiar, it helped to bring that 
future about" (p. 276). In short, Dickinson's "spontaneity" of hyper-word-
consciousness, " self-assaulting and self-doubting, is the destructive strain in Ameri-
can modernism" (p. 294). 
90 BOOK REVIEWS 
Dickinson, The Modern Idiom is neither an indictment of, nor a polemic for, 
Emily Dickinson's poetry. David Porter's study is that rare thing, an excitingly 
written, carefully thought-out critical judgment of Dickinson's strengths and 
disabilities that manages at the same time to discover her still unsettling presence 
in our time. 
DANIEL O'HARA 
Temple University 
The Development of American Ro'mance: The Sacrifice of Relation by Michael 
Davitt Bell. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. 
xiv + 291. $22.50. 
The Ethics of Intensity in American Fiction by Anthony Channel Hilfer. Austin 
and London: University of Texas Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 208. $19.95. 
Taken together these two very different studies assert once again a "broken 
circuit" in the tradition of the American novel that forces apart such elements 
as fact and fiction, imagination and perception, experience and moral evaluation 
and creates two separate and distinct lines of development, one dominant in the 
nineteenth century, the other in the twentieth. On the one hand there are the 
great romancers Df the American Renaissance who self-consciously forge a form 
uniquely American and on the other realists of the early twentieth century who 
seem to ignore their American precursors and look to Europe for their sources 
of inspiration. 
l\1ichael D. Bell's book is an impressive and complex study, the dimensions of 
which are hard to describe in a short review. His approach combines the per-
spectives of the cultural historian and literary critic. Wilile he is interested in 
the theory and practice of Brown, Irving, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville, he is 
equally concerned with the relations of that theory and practice to their experience 
as writers in nineteenth century America. Some of his most interesting analyses 
focus on the relation between certain formal problems of narrative and related 
problems of nineteenth century American culture. Bell quite rightly insists that 
we not take for granted or ignore the fact that these men chose to become 
writers. Each of the authors he discusses begins with a sense of alienation from 
the society whose problems his fiction will mirror, and his career as a writer 
develops in dialectical relation to that society. Inherited conventions, public 
pressures, private needs: these are the issues that entangle the relations between 
the writer as a human being, the writer as a romancer and the writer as social 
critic; and Bell unravels and describes these knots of relations in a suggestive 
and provocative way. 
The starting point for his study is a distinction between two definitions of 
romance, the first, articulated by Hawthorne in the Preface to The House of tbe 
Seven Gables, is conservative and emphasizes the blending of the realms of the 
imaginative and the actual; the second, best described by Henry James in his 
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Preface to the New York edition of Tbe American, is more subversive and 
defines the form in terms of a radical lack of integration between the actual 
and imaginary. For James romance does not have the high seriousness of moral 
fiction. Indeed its essence is to be found in its moral irresponsibility, its indulgence 
in the pleasures of pure fantasy. It is the James model, Bell argues, rather than 
the Hawthorne one that comes closer to the meaning that the word "romance" 
had in British and American discourse before the Civil War where it was 
associated with the excesses and dangers of unrealities and delusions that were 
so widely condemned by orthodox American opinion and was regarded as 
" fiction" opposed to "fact." 
When Brown, Irving, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville turn to romance they do 
so in a climate in which fiction is the object of suspicions and fear. Hence it 
is not surprising that the idea of romance as pure and dangerous fantasy should 
play an important part in their thinldng about their chosen mode. Their 
decisions, then, to sacrifice the relation between fiction and reality are both 
expressions of particular ways of being related to the world and testimonies to 
the difficulties they face as writers. 
Brown turns from the pursuit of legal studies to champion the "writer's elo-
quence and imaginative power in an age and a land intensely suspicious of both 1> 
(42). This "turn," however. is not a sign that he is free of the suspicions of his 
contemporaries. It simply indicates his willingness to face the power of fiction 
directly rather than to displace it by attributing to it a moral or historical 
function. The result is the creation of the figure of the artist as imposter whose 
activities unsettle the balance of his mind as well as that of his reader. In this 
sense Brown's novels contain the seeds of their author's conversion to "prag-
matic Federalism If and his eventual "renunciation of the ravishing power of 
fiction" (43). 
Like Brown, Irving as a writer is preoccupied with the opposition between 
fiction and reality and his exploration of the implications of this opposition leads 
him finally away from fiction toward history and biography. But his starting 
point is a sense of alienation generated by the recognition that his society regards 
the writer as a deviant, and his fictions explore his uncertainties about the 
nature and purpose of his career. Bell's readings of the fictions in this context 
are entirely convincing and rank with those of William L. Hedges as the best 
criticism we have of Irving as a literary artist. 
Writing for Poe, as for Brown and Irving, is a strategy for dealing with the 
personal and cultural situation in which he finds himself, and Bell's description of 
Poe's deviant career is the best thing in his fine book. In many ways Poe is the 
central figure in his study since he is a writer who aggressively embraces his 
career as deviant and then proceeds in his own personal life to bear out his 
society's expectations and assumptions regarding the life completely devoted to 
the imagination. It is within this context that Bell offers his brilliant reading 
of the relation between Poe's theory and practice. 
Like Coleridge to whom he is indebted, Poe sought the spiritual by way of the 
imaginative, but, as Bell perceptively observes, his works seldom move beyond 
the grave. For, Poe, "the word-like the 'spiritual' vampire-is the corpse of 
its origin " (121), and he devotes his career to enacting in work after work the 
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failure of literary expression. The purity of the work of art finally is that of the 
fossil that is no more than a record of the absence of the H noumenal energy that 
produces it" (125). 
Hawthorne and Melville, like Poe, begin their careers with a feeling of 
alienation, and they share with him a sense of the "disrelation" between the 
imagination and the language of romance; but they differ from him as well as 
from Brown and Irving in that they not only reflect the divisions of their culture, 
they self-consciously examine them in their fiction. Hawthorne's work focuses 
on the freedom of the romancer to return imaginative life to petrified forms and 
on the impossibility of using that freedom to achieve social or historical renewal. 
Within the realm of romance the ideal and actual may come together and" each 
imbue itself with the nature of the other", but within nineteenth century 
American society an "inevitable historical process" (192) has resulted in the 
transformation of the original spirit of America into an empty formalism. The 
power of The Scarlet Lette1' derives equally from Hawthorne's recognition of 
the parallels between the "course of romance and the course of history" and 
from his" careful separation of these two congruent realms" (191). And when 
in the later fiction he seeks to bridge the gap between the realms of art and 
society his fiction loses its power and takes on the duplicity of the society that 
it mirrors. 
Melville's career resembles those of the other important nineteenth century 
romancers but his perspective is a more self-consciously revolutionary one. Like 
Hawthorne he senses the relation between the originating impulses of romance and 
those of revolutionary America, and he celebrates this connection in the early 
novels and in Moby Dick. But the full story of his career is the story of his 
progressive disenchantment with both romance and America. Bell traces the 
stages of Melville's growing disillusionment and concludes with a reading of 
The Confidence JUan as an example of the "sacrifice of relation ... fully and 
fatally realized" (245). 
Another and quite different strain in the American Novel is the focus of 
Anthony C. HUfer's The Ethics Of Intensity in American Fiction. He is 
interested in the realistic tradition in American fiction and in the parallels 
between the assumptions of literary realism and pragmatic philosophy. His 
focus is on character or, more specifically, on the displacement of ethos by 
pathos as the principle of characterization in the writings of Whitman, Howells, 
James, Dreiser and Stein. The works of these writers "reveal a shift from 
the self defined primarily in terms of a preformuJated ethical code and 
judged adversely if it departs from that code to the self, defined in terms of its 
emotional intensity and judged adversely for any failure of nerve. In the first 
mode character is seen as the sum of the individual's ethical choices; in the second, 
character is seen as the process of an individual's longing" (xi). Hilfer's book, 
then, is the "study of a turn, in the American novel, toward pathos, process 
and self-realization" (xii). However, this is not a "turn" from the romance 
tradition described by Bell. Hilfer sees his writers in the context of the 
Victorian novel, and °his first chapter is a description of the ethical viewpoint 
encoded in Victorian fiction that the American writers revise. Indeed, with 
the exception of three brief remarks about Hawthorne and a single reference 
each to Poe and Melville, Hilfer ignores the nineteenth century American novel. 
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The American" nineteenth century self" (41) is present in Hilfer's book but 
in the form of a poet rather than a novelist. He devotes a chapter to the 
image of the self in \Nhitman's "Song of Myself," but he provides no more 
explanation for \/vlutman's presence than he does for the absence of Poc, Haw-
thorne and Melville. And to be fair, Hilfer's practice here more than com-
pensates for the absence of a theoretical foundation. The reading that he 
offers of "Song of Myself" is brilliantly done. By focusing on the kinesthetic 
rather than on the visual images in the poem, he is able to usc the techniques of 
close reading on a poetry that in the past has seemed stubbornly to resist such 
analysis. For Whitman, Hilfer argues, the self is the product of the rhythms 
of desire and he substitutes for usual social relationships one in which a 
"highly sensitized self interacts with an imagined reader" (31). Whitman in 
his epic without society "speales not to the self as social actor but to the core 
of loneliness in each person" and as such prepares the "ground for such 
classic American studies of pathos and of the subliminal rhythms of the self 
as Stein's' Melanctha' and Dreiser's Sister Carrie" (47). 
FollO'wing the brilliant Whitman chapter Hilfer goes on to explore the 
dialectical relations between ethical and instinctive or emotional conceptions of 
character in A Modern Instance, "The Beast in the Jungle," The lVings of tbe 
Do'ox, Sister Carrie, An American Tragedy, and" Melanctha," and in the process 
traces a development that moves from Howells' unsuccessful search for an ethical 
base for character, to James' attempt to socialize desire by developing an ethics of 
passion, to Dreiser's vision of desire as the "very engine of life" (164) 
and, finally, to Stein's attempt to incorporate passion into an ethical structure. 
As in the case of Hilfer's discussion of "Song of Myself" his readings of 
individual texts arc convincing and illuminating, the analyses of Sister Carrie and 
An American Tragedy especially so. 
l\1y only reservations concerning Hilfer's study arc theoretical ones. He 
associates his boole with Tanner's Tbe Reign of IFo71der, Poirier's A lVorld 
Elre""J)bere, and Taylor'S Pathos of Thougbt, but the critical-historical paradigm 
that he offers us is a panially unexamincd one in that he silently ignores a major 
tradition in the American novel. Moreonr, as Hilfcr's final paragraphs makc 
clear, his paradigm is an evaluative as well as a descriptive one. For him the 
"qualified, indeterminate resolutions of the tension betwcen ethos and pathos" 
(164) that he finds in his writers gives their work a powcr that scems to him 
missing in later American fiction where e\'cn the category of character itself 
is called into question. It is possible, however, that these later writers arc 
best understood and appreciated in the contest of a genealog~' that includes 
Hawthorne :md i\,Ieh'ille, for these \Hiters offer us a conception of sclfhood 
th:lt suggests a tr:ldition different from the one Hilfer dcscribcs. Both arc 
awarc ;( thc estenr to which identity is a dramatically enacted thing :l11J their 
sense of litera.ry character reflects that awareness. In the Prefacc to The 
BJit!,1ed,l}e Romance, Hawthorne \Hites of thc "strange enchantmcnt" that is 
ncccss.lry to givc his" imagin:lry progeny" a "propriet~· of their 0\\'\1," and 
:\lch-ille in The Confidence 1\1«71 further cnt3.0g1es thc problems gcnealos.'; :1nd 
representation by putting into question the notion of an orderly, predictable 
mO\'cmcllt betwcen origin and im,lge. a tbing or self and its representation. 
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Writers such as Barth, Barthelme, and Pyncheon, whose fictions appear to 
Hilfer "light and thin" (165) seem less idiosyncratic and unrestrained when they 
are viewed in this tradition. The story of the modern and contemporary American 
novel may well be one of the return of the romance. 
EDGAR A. DRYDEN 
University of Arizona 
Early Auden by Edward Mendelson. New York: The Viking Press, 1981. Pp. 
xxiii + 407. $20.00. 
In August 1927 W. H. Auden wrote: 
\Vha stands, the crux left of the watershed 
On the wet road between the chafing grass 
Below him sees dismantled washing-floors, 
Snatches of tramline running to the wood, 
An industry already comatose, 
Yet sparsely living. 
The earliest poem he was ever to reprint, "The Watershed" renders what were 
to be Auden's characteristic properties-his frontier, his mine country, his 
haunting psychological landscapes-in a manner if not Eliotic then impossible 
without Eliot. Not so fine as The Hollow Men poems, like them it presents 
internal division in dream-like externals. (Is the crux-we are unable to answer-
a crossroads or a dilemma?) Here was a modernist talent of the first order, 
amazing in a youth of twenty-one, and destined to sustain the movement beyond 
its founding generation. It is therefore shocking to read a poem of forty one 
years later in which Auden rehearses his signature themes not in an Eliot-like 
psychic drama but in Horatian stanzas and traditional urbanity: 
l\1artini-time: time to draw the curtains and 
choose a composer we should like to hear from, 
before corning to table for one of your 
savory messes. 
Time crumbles all ramparts, brachypod Nemesis 
catches up sooner or later with hare-swift 
Achilles, but personal song and language 
somehow mizzle them. 
Thanks to which it's possible for the breathing 
still to break bread with the dead, whose brotherhood 
gives us confidence to wend the trivial 
thrust of the Present, 
so self-righteous in its assumptions and so 
certain that none dare out-face it. We, Chester, 
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and the choir we sort with have been assigned to 
garrison stations. 
-from "The Garrison" 
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The story of what happened between these two poems is not only the story 
of Auden's career but also the story of what happened to modernist poetry, 
starting in the thirties. The example of Auden presages, though it does not 
predict, Olson and Ashbery. And if Edward Mendelson's explanation of what 
happened (it is also Auden's explanation) is not always satisfying, it is greatly 
to his credit that he recognizes explanation was in order. A definitive study of the 
poet's origins, Early Auden is also an essay on a larger subject of considerable 
interest-the passing of modernist poetry, which now towers over us like an 
immense bear in a glass cage, still growling and certainly intimidating, but part of 
another world. 
About the thoroughness of Mendelson's sleuthing there can be nO question. 
Take, for instance, the matter of Auden's first contacts with Eliot. Through 
unpublished letters and Bloomsbury records we learn how, in June 1927 and 
at Sacheverell Sitwell's urgings, Auden sent some poems to the literary arbiter 
of Faber and Gwyer only to be told, "I do not feel that any of the 
enclosed is quite right, but I should be interested to follow your work." Eliot 
did follow Auden's work, was genuinely interested, and three years later 
accepted a manuscript. that would probably have been impossible without his 
initial rebuke. By 1932 Eliot was feeling downright avuncular, and when Auden 
worried that The Orators might be obscure enough to require a prefatory note, 
Eliot, "who had experience in such matters advised Auden not to apologize ... the 
preface was dropped." 
Bnt this kind of thing is trivial compared with the book's real contribution 
to literary history, which is a wealth of hitherto unpublished commentary by 
Anden concerning what he was about when he wrote, augmented by manuscript 
evidence discovered in the poet's notebooks. We learn that Tbe Orators, for 
example, grew out of an anthropology paper written by Anden's friend John 
Layard, and that its symbols are rooted in Trobriander shaman myths. Auden 
enlarged this ritual schema with schoolboy memories, analyses of contemporary 
rhetoric, a memorial of Lawrence and a good deal of self-portraiture. The 
result, as the poet recognized immediately and as readers have long confirmed, 
was a brilliant work crippled by ambivalence. Three months after its publi-
cation, Auden wrote to a friend (the letter is now in the university library at 
Buffalo) how" dissatisfied" he was: "The conception was alright but I didn't 
take enough trouble over it, and the result is far too obscure and equivocal. 
It is meant to be a critique of the fascist outlook, but from its reception among 
some of my contemporaries, and on rereading it myself, I see that it can, most 
of it, be interpreted as a favourable exposition." 
From a lifetime's worth of such self-criticism, Mendelson derives the contours 
of a career, and then goes on to characterize Auden's development as the 
century's paradigmatic turn away from modernist (that is to say, post-romantic) 
assumptions. Anden, according to IVlendelson, "was the first English writer who 
absorbed all the lessons of modernism, but also understood its limits, and chose to 
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turn elsewhere." Beginning with modernism's central conception of poems 
as "visionary autonomous objects," with its concomitant belief that language can 
never be more than an incomplete bridge over the gulf of silence, in later 
years Audeo devoted himself to writing a public poetry meant to be judged not 
only for its art but its truth and committed to establishing a "community of 
meaning." He held that "an artist must convey knowledge that is not ex-
clusively his own, that he and others can put to use," and he wrote that "the 
self must first learn to be indifferent; as Lenin said, 'to go hungry, work illegally 
and be anonymous.'" He became, as Mendelson tells it, the revitalizer of a 
"civil tradition of poetry" that extends back to Chaucer and thus "the most 
inclusive poet of the twentieth century, its most technically skilled, and its 
most truthful." 
This, it seems to me, is out of line. Mendelson's sympathy with his subject 
is commendable, and his grasp of modernism's romantic roots and its connections 
to poststructuralist theories of language is impressive, but his assertion that 
Auden is the theorist and forerunner of a new era of poetry leaves something 
to be desired, For one thing, Mendelson is a bit too sanguine about the 
possibility of leaving the conundrums of twentieth century authenticity behind. 
It is well and good to say that "the poets of modernism felt they could 
bring tradition into the present only as battered ironic fragments, or by heroic 
efforts to make it new; for Auden it had never grown old." But after the truths 
of the modern condition enunciated by Nietzsche, Freud and nineteenth century 
historiography, it is a little naive to decide on one's own that the structures 
of the past do not decay, and to take up old forms as if unchanged. In that 
light, the rhetorical practices of Auden's later verse, founded on little more than 
the realization of having reached a dead end, seem a little like the actions of 
a man who has decided that modern physics is decadent and starts mapping his 
course with an astrolabe. 
The most serious problem with Mendelson's thesis, however, is that it fails 
to account for parallel trends in the figures he says Auden left behind, and so 
distorts our understanding of modernist literature. Auden was hardly the only 
twentieth century writer to decry the prison house he was forced to inhabit, 
or to search for techniques to escape it. In holding that the poet must convey 
knowledge that is not exclusively his own, for example, or that the frontier 
between private perception and public fact must be challenged, Auden was not 
so different from Ezra Pound-a man much maligned in this volume but one who 
spent most of his maturity trying to write "the tale of the tribe," More 
significantly, in affirming that" no egotist can become a mature writer until he has 
learnt to recognize and to accept his egotism," that" love makes possible a union 
of isolated individual perspectives in a coherent work of art, one broader and 
larger than any single point of view could allow," and further that" the first, 
second and third thing in any art is subject," Auden inescapably calls up Eliot, 
whose later career his own mirrors uncannily. Eliot too spent the years of his 
middle age searching for a rhetoric that would allow him to transcend the 
bounds of self, and his "Lancelot Andrewes" echoes Auden by praising work 
that struggles with the literary consequences of egotism. The Andl'ewes of 
the sermons, Eliot wrote, was "wholly in his subject, unaware of anything 
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else .•.. [His] emotion is purely contemplative; it is not petsonal, it is wholly 
evoked by tbe object of contemplation, to which it is adequate." From here it 
is but a short step to the Four Quartets, which surpass anything the later Auden 
wrote because, even in their deconstruction of language and self, they do not 
forget the conditions of modem writing: in Eliot's words, tradition unselfcon-
sciously assumed is no more than "some pleasing archaeological reconstruction." 
Awaiting the second installment of Professor Mendelson's excellent study, 
tberefore, we must provisionally agree not with the later Auden he so warmly 
endotses but witb tbe younger man whom we find at the beginning of the 
present book. The strain may indeed be heavy, but "Private faces in public 
places/Are [still] wiser and nicer/Than public faces in private places." (From 
the poem prefatory to The Orators.) 
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